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Abstract – In many applications, a light curtain is used to 
detect the intrusion of a human (or other protected 
object) into the danger zone. After detecting the 
interruption of the light curtain, a safety function is 
activated to bring the danger zone into a safe state (non-
human). If the space taken by the light curtain is at the 
same time a working space, it is necessary to distinguish 
whether the light curtain interrupt is caused by man or 
material (material flows cannot cause the dangerous zone 
to be put into a safe state). There are several ways how to 
achieve this resolution, but additional (optional) sensors 
are commonly used. The paper deals with the parameters 
of additional sensors and how to connect them to the 
achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the safety 
functions realized by the help of the light curtain. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most common means of detecting the 
presence of an object is a light curtain (LC). Its usage 
can be found in a variety of applications ranging from 
consumer electronics to safety applications. Just such 
an application is dedicated to this post. These are 
applications that, in addition to the required operation, 
also require the achievement of the required Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) in accordance with the 
requirements of EN IEC 61508 [1]. Currently, such 
applications are not used only in transport but also in 
industry. A common feature of safety features utilizing 
a light curtain is the secure detection of the object and 
the subsequent reaction, usually putting the dangerous 
zone in the safe state behind the light curtain. The 
situation is illustrated in Fig. 1. The danger zone poses 
a danger to the moving object therefore the light curtain 
is in distance l from the danger zone ([2] deals with the 
determination of this distance in detail deals with the 
determination of this distance in detail). Its purpose is 
to detect object input. Information about the 
interruption of the light curtain is processed by the 
control system (e.g. safety PLC (Programmable Logic 
Controller)); the safety PLC is comprehensive control 
system that can perform complicated standard functions 
simultaneously with performing safety functions, [3]), 
which subsequently (according to the algorithm 
implemented in the control software) influences the 
hazard generating elements in a way that the danger 
disappears. 
 
Fig. 1. Protection of the moving object before entering the danger 
zone. 
If the hazard generated by a dangerous zone can 
potentially cause a threat to the health or life of the 
person, damage to the environment, or large material 
damage, then the function depicted in Fig. 1 is called 
the safety function. It eliminates potential hazards. 
These must be eliminated with SIL based on risk 
analysis. The use of certified software blocks and the 
subsequent verification of the application guarantees 
the systematic integrity of the safety function of the 
implemented safety function (for example, see [4], [5], 
[6]). The integrity of the safety against accidental 
failures is determined by the components used and the 
way they are connected. In order to determine the 
achieved SIL for specific components, their 
involvement, parameters and communication links, a 
suitable model should be developed. This issue is 
addressed by many publications [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], 
[12]. 
For the rate of dangerous safety function failure 
realized according to Fig. 1 applies: 
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where   is the rate of dangerous failure light curtain, 
  is the rate of dangerous control system failure and 

is the rate of dangerous actuator failure. 
Probability of dangerous safety function failure is 
expressed by equation: 
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where    is the probability of dangerous light 
curtain failure,   is the probability of dangerous 
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 control system failure and  is the probability of 
dangerous actuator failure. 
Assuming the exponential distribution of failures 
probability (generally acceptable assumptions for 
electronic devices), the following applies: 
 
     
  !  (3) 
 
II. THE MOST FREQUENT USE OF LIGHT CURTAIN 
In Fig. 1 is the basic case of using the light curtain. 
The light curtain used for this purpose must meet 
precisely defined properties. It is not just a simple 
optical system (transmitter-receiver), but a whole 
optical system with internal logic of evaluation. The 
design of this optical system is mentioned by [13]. The 
properties of this system (e.g. the number of beams used 
for object detection, their minimum distances, etc.) 
define the relevant standards according to the purpose 
of the use of the light curtain [14]. 
The implementation of some safety functions 
however requires not only the detection of the passage 
of an object in a certain location but also species 
determination of object entering the dangerous zone or 
to determine the direction through which the object 
passes through the light curtain. Then for a defined 
object type, for some direction of movement through 
the light curtain, interruption of the light curtain will not 
cause the dangerous zone to be brought into a safe state 
(this object or direction is allowed) and vice versa for 
another object or the direction of the movement 
indicates that the dangerous zone is in a safe state (this 
object or direction is forbidden). The most common is 
to distinguish the entry of a person into the danger zone 
from the entrance of a technical device (e.g. a vehicle). 
Such resolution can be done by using additional 
sensors. Incorrect evaluation of the object, resp. the 
direction of movement would lead to a dangerous 
situation, such a solution should be subjected to a safety 
analysis. 
A. Implementing safety functions that determine the 
type of object 
Fig. 2 shows the most common cases of placing 
additional sensors enabling to distinguish the object 
type moving through the light curtain. The object-type 
resolution principle is to evaluate the sequence of the 
individual sensor readings. When moving the object as 
shown in the figure, the pair of sensors S1 and S2 is first 
affected by, then the light curtain is interrupted, and 
then the pair of sensors S3 and S4 is affected by. The 
logic evaluating this sequence subsequently expects the 
successive releases of the S1 and S2 sensors, then 
releasing the light curtain and finally releasing the pair 
of sensors S3 and S4. By following this sequence of 
influencing and releasing the individual sensors, the 
moving object is evaluated as an object that has access 
to the dangerous zone enabled and the MUTING 
function is activated (to suppress the interruption of the 
light curtain). As a result, the dangerous zone is not 
brought into a safe state. The location of the sensors and 
the type of sensors must be such that an object that does 
not have access to a dangerous zone (mostly a human) 
does not cause a defined sequence of influence and 
release of sensors S1, S2, S3 and S4. Light curtain 
interruption without affecting the sensors will cause the 
dangerous zone to be brought into a safe state. 
Fig. 2a) represents the case where inductive sensors 
are used. In Fig. 2b) optical sensors are shown. In both 
cases, it is necessary to choose their geometric 
arrangement so that the objects are safely distinguished 
(especially geometric dimensions and object material 
should be considered). Fig. 2c) illustrates the use of 
two crossover optical sensors. Their appropriate 
location makes it possible to detect the object both 
before and behind the light curtain. 
The evaluation of information from individual 
sensors and the subsequent MUTING function can be 
performed either directly in the firmware of the light 
curtain or in the application software of the control 
system (depending on the type of light curtain used). 
 
 
a)      
 
b) 
 
c) 
Fig. 2. The most common cases of sensor placement to distinguish 
an object type moving through a light curtain 
 B. Implementing safety functions that distinguish the 
object´s direction 
Fig. 3 shows the case of using a light curtain with 
detection of the motion direction (the direction of 
movement shown in the figure is a direction allowed - 
the MUTING function is activated). Even in this case, 
additional sensors are used. Fig. 3a) shows the use of 
inductive sensors and Fig. 3b) shows the use of optical 
sensors. Movement of the object from the dangerous 
zone is allowed and when the light curtain is 
interrupted, the MUTING function is activated and the 
movement of the object towards the dangerous zone is 
not allowed and the MUTING function is not activated. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 3. Light curtain with motion detection 
III. ANALYSIS OF LIGHT CURTAIN SAFETY 
If the light curtain is one of the hardware 
components performing the safety function, it is 
necessary to deal with its safety. In the simplest case, a 
light curtain can be used without additional sensors 
(without MUTING function, Fig. 1.). In this case, the 
data from the manufacturer of the light curtain is 
directly usable in analyzing the safety of the 
implemented safety function. If the light curtain has a 
MUTING function, it is also necessary to address the 
effects of additional MUTING sensors for safety. 
A. Light curtain without MUTING function 
In case without MUTING function of light curtain, 
a failure can be defined as a failure to declare a light 
curtain if an object is located in its detection zone. In 
Fig. 4 there is a Continuous Time Markov Chain 
(CTMC) describing the transition without MUTING 
function of light curtain from a safety state (state 1) to 
a dangerous state (state 2). 
 
Fig. 4. CTMC - the occurence of a failure LC without MUTING 
function 
From the CTMC in Fig. 4 a relation for probability 
dangerous failure calculation of the light curtain can be 
derived: 
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B. Light curtain with MUTING function 
The light curtain with MUTING function may 
define a failure as a failure to declare the light curtain 
in the case when there is an unauthorized object in its 
detection zone, or a failure to signal the light curtain 
interruption if the object passes through the detection 
zone in the unauthorized direction. In this case, a 
dangerous failure may result in a failure of the light 
curtain, or the failure of the additional sensors to 
provide the object type or its direction. 
The occurrence of a failure of a MUTING function 
with light curtain may be described by the CTMC in     
Fig. 5. The CTMC is assembled on condition that the 
additional sensors providing the object type or its 
direction are identical   *  +. 
 
 
Fig. 5. CTMC - the occurrence of a failure LC with MUTING 
function 
From state 1 (without failure state), LC with 
MUTING function can reach: 
• state 5 (dangerous state) after a dangerous 
failure of the light curtain; 
• state 2 after occurrence of undetectable sensor 
error S1 or S2 (c is the coefficient of diagnostic 
coverage); 
• state 3 after occurrence of detectable sensor 
failure S1 or S2. 
From state 2, LC with MUTING function can go to: 
• the state 5 (dangerous state) after the 
occurrence of a dangerous failure of the light 
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 curtain or after a failure of sensor S1 or S2 
(both sensors have a failure); 
• state 3 after occurrence of detectable sensor 
failure S1 or S2 (this is the occurrence of a 
detectable failure of the same sensor on which 
an undetectable failure has already occurred) or 
after the sensor is affected by the object (if the 
sensor is in a state of undetectable failure and 
after the sensor is affected by the object this 
failure becomes detectable). 
From state 3, LC with MUTING function can go to: 
• the state 5 (dangerous state) after the 
occurrence of a dangerous failure of the light 
curtain or after a failure of sensor S1 or S2 
(both sensors have a failure); 
• state 4 (safe state after failure detection) after a 
discrepancy between information from S1 and 
S2 sensors lasting longer than a defined time 
interval. 
From state 4, LC with MUTING function can go to 
state 1 after system restoration. The rate of this 
transition is 
5  *
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where MDT is mean down time. 
The rate of the transition from state 2 to state 3 after 
the sensor is affected by the object depends on how 
often the object passes through the sensor. Since it does 
not have to be a regular interval, we will start from a 
pessimistic assumption and consider the longest 
interval between two consecutive objects 89:;. Then: 
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The rate of transition from state 3 to state 4 is rated 
by: 
3  *
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where CDEF is discrepancy time of sensors S1 and S2.  
CTMC in Fig. 4 does not consider sensor S3 and S4 
failures (the cases shown in Fig. 2a) and 2b)) because 
these sensors do not affect the occurrence of a 
dangerous state (transition to state 5). 
CTMC in Fig. 4 can be described as a system of 
differential equations 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
When modeling the probability of a dangerous 
failure LC or LC with MUTING function and 
presenting experimental results the following 
assumptions will be considered: 
• The light curtain used has a rate of dangerous 
failures   LM NO;P*  (safety light 
curtain (Sick - deTec4 Prime)). 
• We use two types of additional sensors (to 
highlight their safety effect) better with the 
rate of failures                             * 
+  Q NK;P*  and less quality with 
failure rate   *  +  L NK;P*. 
• Detection of sensor failures is a matter of 
mutual comparison therefore a detectable 
failure of the sensor is one that is reflected by 
a change in the logic value at its output, and an 
undetectable failure is the one that does not 
occur by changing the logic value at its output. 
Given the generally acceptable symmetrical 
manifestation of the failure of the electronic 
elements, we assume the diagnostic coverage 
c = 0,5. 
• Object transition by light curtain at two 
different time intervals – short 89:  ;RST 
and long 89:  U;PVW. 
• Allowed sensor time discrepancy CDEF  ;X. 
• Mean down time YZ[  ;P (it is only one 
sensor replacement after detecting its failure, 
assuming the sensor is part of the stock). 
Fig. 6 shows the time course of probability of a LC 
and LC failure with MUTING. The graph in Fig. 6a) 
captures the time in the range of 0 h - 180 000 h 
(approximately 20 years, the commonly considered life 
of the systems). The graph in Fig. 6b) shows a more 
detailed view of curves 3, 4 and 5, which in Fig. 6a) 
partially coincide. Curves 1-4 illustrate the probability 
of dangerous failure of a LC with MUTING function, 
curve 5 is shown for comparison, and represents the 
probability of dangerous failure of a LC without 
MUTING function. The curves are based on the CTMC 
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 and model parameters for each run 
are shown in Table I. 
Table I. The curve parameters show in Fig. 6 
curve model ,\P*] 89:\P] 
1 Fig. 5 L NK 8 
2 Fig. 5 Q NK 8 
3 Fig. 5 L NK 0,0167 (1 min) 
4 Fig. 5 Q NK 0,0167 (1 min) 
5 Fig. 4 - - 

  LM NO P*; CDEF  ;^; YZ[  ;P 
 
 From the curves in Fig. 6 we can see that the 
probability of dangerous failure of a LC without 
MUTING function is the lowest one. It is caused by the 
fact that the remaining four curves are assembled for 
LC with MUTING function and therefore they use 
additional sensors that also affect the probability of a 
dangerous failure. However, it is important to analyze 
curves 1-4 as they perform the same function and 
indicate the effect of the rate failure of the additional 
sensor   and the effect of the length of the interval 
between two consecutive objects 89:. 
An analysis of the processes shows that a significant 
safety impact is to detect sensor failures. MUTING 
devices have only functional diagnostics (the 
evaluation algorithm does not have a test diagnostic at 
the application level), therefore the efficiency of failure 
detection depends on the change in the status that 
occurs when evaluating the presence of the object 
(parameter 89:  significantly affects the effectiveness 
of functional diagnostics). This can also be seen from a 
comparison of the 1, 3 and 2, 4. At the same rate of the 
sensor failures, the course with greater 89:  (curve 1 
and 2) has significantly higher probability of failure 
than a course with smaller 89: (curve 3 and 4). It is 
also possible to say that for a longer time 89:  (less 
efficient diagnostics, less frequent to verify the 
functionality of the additional sensors), the influence of 
the rate of the failures of the additional sensors is more 
considerable (curves 1, 2) than at lower time 89: 
(curves 3, 4). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Protected area monitoring using the light curtain is 
one of the frequently used safety functions. In many 
cases, such features are deployed on a routine basis 
without more detailed analysis of the impact of various 
factors on safety. The paper analyzes the impact of 
selected factors on function safety with the MUTING 
function with the light curtain. Safety factors have been 
selected so that the results of the contribution could be 
used in practical applications. When performing safety 
functions, the integrity of safety against systematic 
errors must be met, so it is appropriate to use the 
certified function blocks or firmware of the certified 
light curtain to evaluate the information with additional 
sensors. More complex view on the implementation of 
safety function with a light curtain would be gained by 
analysis of the influence of the parameters on other 
properties, especially on reliability of the implemented 
functions. That kind of analysis, however, is not part of 
the scope of this paper. 
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Fig. 6. Probability dangerous failure of LC and LC with MUTING function 
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